When the U-2
   Went to Sea
   By Norman Polmar
   During 44 years of service with the Central Intelligence Agency and Air 
Force, the U-2 spyplane has been flown from bases in the United States, 
Britain, Cyprus, France, India, Pakistan, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, 
Turkey, South Vietnam, and a few other places.

   And it has been operated from aircraft carriers.

   Even with an operational radius of some 3,000 miles, U-2s flying out of 
"safe" land bases could not reach every single area of interest to the 
United States intelligence community. Some places were just too far away. 
Thus, in the late 1950s, the CIA came up with the idea of operating U-2s 
from carriers at sea.

   Richard M. Bissell, head of the CIA's U-2 program, recalled, "Navy 
officials seemed interested when I approached them, but the Air Force 
refused to participate."

   In mid-1963 the CIA initiated Project Whale Tale, the goal of which was 
to adapt U-2s for carrier operation. The glider-like configuration of the 
U-2 made it capable of taking off unassisted from a carrier when there was 
a high wind-over-deck factor. Its slow approach speed made arrested 
landings relatively easy, with the carrier's arresting cables kept at their 
lowest setting. The carrier could provide 30 knots of wind over deck into 
the face of the aircraft, resulting in a closing speed of just 50 knots. 
The airplane had plenty of power for a wave-off during landing.

   Carrier flight tests commenced in August 1963. In the dead of night, a 
Navy crane lifted a U-2 onto the deck of the carrier Kitty Hawk, which was 
based at North Island naval air station in San Diego. On the next morning 
(Aug. 5), as the ship steamed off the California coast, Lockheed test pilot 
Bob Schumacher took off with a full fuel load and with a deck! run of 321 
feet.

   Hard Landing

   Next, Schumacher made a number of practice approaches, and he then 
commenced landing. A CIA report said, "Although the takeoff was very 
successful, the attempted landing was not. The aircraft bounced, hit hard 
on one wingtip, and then just barely managed to become airborne again 
before reaching the end of the deck."

   The Navy then performed modifications to three U-2A variants. It gave 
them stronger landing gear, an arresting hook, and wing "spoilers" capable 
of canceling aerodynamic lift when the aircraft came over the deck. These 
aircraft were designated as U-2Gs and painted with N-series civilian serial 
numbers and Office of Naval Research markings.

   In preparation for further carrier operations, Schumacher and several 
other CIA pilots were checked out in the Navy's T-2A Buckeye jet trainer 
and made practice landings on the training carrier Lexington.

   The first successful carrier landing of a U-2G occurred March 2, 1964. 
Schumacher made a series of touch-and-go landings aboard the carrier Ranger 
steaming off the California coast. He then made the first full landing of a 
U-2 aboard a ship. In that first landing, the hook engaged, but the rear of 
the U-2 tipped up and the nose dug into the deck, breaking the pitot tube. 
After hasty repairs the U-2 was flown off.

   A few days later, Schumacher and CIA pilots made several successful 
takeoffs from and landings on Ranger. The upshot of these successful trials 
was that the Navy considered five CIA pilots to be carrier-qualified.

   The carrier-based U-2 evidently wasn't in high demand. In fact, it is 
known to have flown only one operational mission, as part of Operation 
Seeker. It occurred in May 1964. Ranger launched a U-2G spyplane to monitor 
nuclear tests carried out by France at Mururoa atoll, a Pacific test site 
in French Polynesia. U-2G photographs indicated that France would be ready 
for full-scale production of nuclear weapons within a year.


   Above is a USAF U-2A. The Navy gave several U-2As stronger landing gear, 
an arresting hook, and spoilers. Designated U-2Gs, they were prepared for 
carrier operations in an effort to extend the range of US intelligence 
gathering.


   Bigger Aircraft

   Several more CIA pilots became carrier-qualified over the next few 
years, but the only significant event concerned a change in aircraft when 
the program went to the U-2R.

   The U-2R variant, which entered service in 1967, was 40 percent larger 
than the earlier U-2. It had twice the range and could carry a payload four 
times as large. The Navy aircraft had an arresting hook. The outer six feet 
of each wing folded back to facilitate handling aboard ship. The aircraft 
bore the fictitious Navy markings N812X.

   The trials of the U-2R, using the deck of the carrier America, took 
place during the period Nov. 21-23, 1969, off the Virginia Capes. One of 
the pilots was Bill Park, a former Air Force fighter pilot and senior 
Lockheed test pilot. He was joined by four CIA pilots. The five of them 
underwent an abbreviated carrier training course and then flew the America 
trials.

   Testers aborted the first landing attempt when they discovered that the 
ground crew had left the locking pin in the tailhook assembly. The rest 
were successful. In a report on the subsequent trials, Park said:

   "The airplane demonstrated good wave-off characteristics, and I felt at 
the time that landing could be made without a hook. We required very little 
special handling and even took the airplane down to the hangar deck. The 
outer 70 inches of the wings fold and by careful placement on the elevator 
we could get it in [the hangar] with no problem."

   For all that, the idea of the seagoing U-2 just never generated much 
enthusiasm. The official CIA history contends that the agency conducted no 
further U-2 missions from an aircraft carrier. It said: "Aircraft carriers 
are enormously expensive to operate and require an entire! flotill a of 
vessels to protect and service them. The movement of large numbers of big 
ships is difficult to conceal and cannot be hastily accomplished, while the 
deployment of a solitary U-2 to a remote airfield can take place 
overnight."


   A U-2R undergoes carrier qualifications on USS America in November 1969. 
By this time, the spyplane was 40 percent larger than earlier versions, but 
its wings folded up and it required little special handling on the carrier.


   The Navy wasn't finished with the U-2, however. In a separate program in 
1973-74, two U-2R aircraft were modified to the U-2EPX configuration for 
evaluation by the US Navy for the ocean surveillance role. During the 
evaluation the airplanes were fitted with a derivative of the AN/ALQ-110 
Big Look surveillance system, a modified AN/APS-116 forward-looking radar 
(useful for detecting surface ships and periscopes or snorkels of submerged 
submarines), and an infrared detection unit. The radar, fitted in the U-2's 
sensor or "Q" bay, had an antenna protruding below the fuselage in an 
inflatable radome.

   The U-2EPX was to link its radar to surface ships under a program known 
as Outlaw Hawk. Other sensors, including space- and land-based, were to be 
linked to a command center ashore and, subsequently, fitted in the carrier 
Kitty Hawk. During the Outlaw Hawk exercise involving Kitty Hawk, the 
carrier steamed from San Diego to Pearl Harbor, with the U-2s flying from 
California. (The participation of U-2s in another Outlaw Hawk exercise in 
the Mediterranean was canceled.) The U-2EPX concept died because of high 
costs and the promised effectiveness of satellites for ocean surveillance.

   Lockheed, ever hopeful of an enlarged U-2 program, also proposed the 
315B design, a two-seat variant that would carry Condor anti-ship missiles 
under its wings. Development of the Condor missile-which was to have 
carried a conventional or W73 nuclear warhead-was canceled before becoming 
o! peration al. Yet another "payload" envisioned for U-2s in this period 
was a pair of drones that would be released to serve as decoys for missiles 
fired against the U-2.

   Still, no U-2 variant ever entered naval service. At the same time, 
Boeing proposed a much larger aircraft of this type (i.e., a powered glider 
with a 200-foot wingspan) for the ocean surveillance role. The Navy did not 
build it.

   The carrier and naval aspects of U-2 development and operations, though 
interesting, occupy but a few pages in the record of the U-2 spyplane, a 
most unusual and important aircraft.





   
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   Norman Polmar is a Washington-based defense analyst and author. He has 
written several books on aviation, naval, and intelligence subjects, his 
latest being Spyplane: The U-2 History, on which he based this article. His 
most recent article for Air Force Magazine, "Longer Reach for Soviet 
Seapower," appeared in the June 1990 issue.